Este es un artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo los términos de la Licencia de Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial Internacional 4.0 (CC BY- NC 4.0), que permite su uso, distribución y reproducción en cualquier medio, así como generar obras derivadas; siempre y cuando se reconozca al autor original y se haga con nes no comerciales. Las opiniones y contenidos de los documentos publicados corresponden exclusivamente a sus autores. ISSN 2707-7330 https:/ /rpi.isri.cu/rpi rpi@isri.minrex.gob.cu https://creativecommons. org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ RNPS: No. 2092 Vol. VIII, No. 4 (octubre-diciembre) | 2026 Ph.D. Le Thi Van Nga Doctor of Philosophy (International Economics). Director and researcher of the Center for Latin American Studies, Institute for European and Americas Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam. pevannga@ gmail.com 0009-0001-5864-8470 Cómo citar (APA, séptima edición): Van Nga, L. T. (2026). US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Impli- cations for Vietnam. Política Internacional, VIII (Nro. 4). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22098138 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22098138 RECEIVED: JULY 22, 2026 APPROVED: SEPTEMBER 3rd, 2026 PUBLISHED: OCTOBER 19TH, 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam La competencia geoeconómica entre Estados Unidos y China en Brasil: Implicaciones de política para Vietnam La compétition géoéconomique entre les États-Unis et la Chine au Brésil : implications politiques pour le Vietnam A competição geoeconômica entre os Estados Unidos e a China no Brasil: implicações políticas para o Vietnã ABSTRACT The geoeconomic competition between the United States and China in Brazil reects the growing tenden- cy of major powers to employ economic instruments to expand their inuence and shape global supply chains. Drawing on a geoeconomic approach and employing qualitative research methods, including do- cument analysis, case study, and comparative analysis, this study examines the strategies adopted by the United States and China in the Brazilian market during the period 2014-2025, while also analyzing Brazil’s responses to the competition between the two powers. The ndings indicate that the United States has primarily relied on its comparative advantages in technology, nance, and innovation, whereas China has 256 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga expanded its inuence through trade, infrastructure investment, energy cooperation, and supply chain in- tegration. Brazil has pursued a hedging strategy by maintaining relations with both major powers in order to maximize economic benets while preserving its strategic autonomy. Based on the Brazilian case, the article proposes several policy implications for Vietnam, including the diversication of external economic relations, the strengthening of domestic capabilities, and the enhancement of strategic autonomy in the context of intensifying geoeconomic competition. The ndings highlight that strategic autonomy is best achieved through the combination of diversied external partnerships and strengthened domestic capa- bilities rather than alignment with any single major power. As a qualitative single-case study based pri- marily on secondary sources, the ndings should be interpreted as analytical insights rather than broadly generalizable conclusions. Keywords: Geoeconomics; US-China competition; Brazil; strategic autonomy; Vietnam. RESUMEN La competencia geoeconómica entre Estados Unidos y China en Brasil reeja la creciente tendencia de las grandes potencias a utilizar instrumentos económicos para ampliar su inuencia y congurar las cade- nas de suministro globales. Basado en un enfoque geoeconómico y mediante métodos de investigación cualitativa, que incluyen el análisis documental, el estudio de caso y el análisis comparativo, este estudio examina las estrategias adoptadas por Estados Unidos y China en el mercado brasileño durante el período 2014–2025, así como la respuesta de Brasil ante la competencia entre ambas potencias. Los resultados muestran que Estados Unidos ha basado principalmente su estrategia en sus ventajas comparativas en tecnología, nanzas e innovación, mientras que China ha ampliado su inuencia mediante el comercio, la inversión en infraestructura, la cooperación energética y la integración en las cadenas de suministro. Brasil ha seguido una estrategia de hedging, manteniendo relaciones con ambas potencias con el n de maxi- mizar los benecios económicos y preservar su autonomía estratégica. A partir del caso de Brasil, el artí- culo propone varias implicaciones de política para Vietnam, entre ellas la diversicación de las relaciones económicas exteriores, el fortalecimiento de las capacidades internas y el incremento de la autonomía es- tratégica en un contexto de creciente competencia geoeconómica. Los resultados ponen de relieve que la autonomía estratégica se alcanza de manera más efectiva mediante la combinación de una diversicación de las relaciones exteriores y el fortalecimiento de las capacidades internas, en lugar del alineamiento con una sola gran potencia. Al tratarse de un estudio cualitativo basado en un único caso y sustentado princi- palmente en fuentes secundarias, los resultados deben interpretarse como aportes analíticos y no como conclusiones ampliamente generalizables. Palabras clave: geoeconomía; competencia entre Estados Unidos y China; Brasil; autonomía estratégica; Vietnam. RÉSUMÉ La compétition géoéconomique entre les États-Unis et la Chine au Brésil illustre la tendance croissante des grandes puissances à utiliser des instruments économiques pour étendre leur inuence et façonner les chaînes d'approvisionnement mondiales. S'appuyant sur une approche géoéconomique et des méthodes de recherche qualitatives, notamment l'analyse documentaire, l'étude de cas et l'analyse comparative, cette étude examine les stratégies adoptées par les États-Unis et la Chine sur le marché brésilien entre 2014 et 2025, tout en analysant les réponses du Brésil à cette compétition. Les résultats indiquent que les États-Unis se sont principalement appuyés sur leurs avantages comparatifs en matière de technologie, de 257 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga nance et d'innovation, tandis que la Chine a étendu son inuence par le biais du commerce, des inves- tissements dans les infrastructures, de la coopération énergétique et de l'intégration des chaînes d'ap- provisionnement. Le Brésil a adopté une stratégie de diversication en maintenant des relations avec les deux grandes puissances an de maximiser ses avantages économiques tout en préservant son autonomie stratégique. À partir de l'exemple brésilien, cet article propose plusieurs recommandations politiques pour le Vietnam, notamment la diversication de ses relations économiques extérieures, le renforcement de ses capacités nationales et le développement de son autonomie stratégique dans un contexte d'intensication de la compétition géoéconomique. Les résultats soulignent que l'autonomie stratégique s'acquiert plus ef- cacement par la combinaison de partenariats extérieurs diversiés et de capacités nationales renforcées que par un alignement sur une seule grande puissance. S'agissant d'une étude de cas qualitative fondée principalement sur des sources secondaires, les résultats doivent être interprétés comme des analyses pertinentes et non comme des conclusions généralisables. Mots-clés : Géoéconomie ; rivalité sino-américaine ; Brésil ; autonomie stratégique ; Vietnam. RESUMO A competição geoeconômica entre os Estados Unidos e a China no Brasil reete a crescente tendência das grandes potências de empregar instrumentos econômicos para expandir sua in- uência e moldar as cadeias de suprimentos globais. Com base em uma abordagem geoeco- nômica e empregando métodos de pesquisa qualitativa, incluindo análise documental, estudo de caso e análise comparativa, este estudo examina as estratégias adotadas pelos Estados Unidos e pela China no mercado brasileiro durante o período de 2014 a 2025, analisando também as respostas do Brasil à competição entre as duas potências. Os resultados indicam que os Estados Unidos se basearam principalmente em suas vantagens comparativas em tecnologia, nanças e inovação, enquanto a China expandiu sua inuência por meio do comércio, investimento em in- fraestrutura, cooperação energética e integração da cadeia de suprimentos. O Brasil adotou uma estratégia de proteção, mantendo relações com ambas as grandes potências a m de maximizar os benefícios econômicos, preservando sua autonomia estratégica. Com base no caso brasile- iro, o artigo propõe diversas implicações políticas para o Vietnã, incluindo a diversicação das relações econômicas externas, o fortalecimento das capacidades internas e a ampliação da au- tonomia estratégica no contexto da intensicação da competição geoeconômica. Os resultados destacam que a autonomia estratégica é melhor alcançada por meio da combinação de parcerias externas diversicadas e capacidades domésticas fortalecidas, em vez do alinhamento com uma única grande potência. Como um estudo de caso único qualitativo baseado principalmente em fontes secundárias, os resultados devem ser interpretados como insights analíticos, e não como conclusões amplamente generalizáveis. Palavras-chave: Geoeconomia; competição EUA-China; Brasil; autonomia estratégica; Vietnã. INTRODUCTION In recent years, strategic competition between the United States and China has increasingly expan- ded beyond the security domain into the economic sphere, making geoeconomics an important instru- ment for pursuing national interests and expanding international inuence. Through trade, investment, nance, technology, energy, and supply chains, the two major powers seek not only to expand their 258 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga markets but also to shape economic and technolo- gical networks in ways that advance their strategic interests. This trend has become particularly evident in emerging economies with strategic locations and abundant natural resources, among which Brazil re- presents a prominent case. As the largest economy in Latin America and a member of both BRICS and the G20, Brazil main- tains extensive economic relations with both the United States and China. While China has become Brazil’s largest trading partner and has continuous- ly expanded its investments in energy, mining, in- frastructure, and manufacturing, the United States remains a key partner in foreign direct investment, technology, nance, the digital economy, and in- novation. The simultaneous presence of these two major powers has turned Brazil into one of the most prominent arenas of geoeconomic competition, re- ecting how major powers have adjusted their stra- tegies in response to changes in the international economic and political environment. This article selects Brazil as a case study not be- cause it is directly comparable to Vietnam in terms of development conditions or geopolitical context, but because it provides a representative example of how a large emerging economy responds to stra- tegic competition between major powers. Through its diversied foreign policy and relatively indepen- dent development strategy, Brazil has maintained cooperative relations with both the United States and China in order to mobilize external resources for development while minimizing the risks associa- ted with excessive dependence on a single partner. Although Brazil and Vietnam dier substantially in economic scale, geostrategic position, and securi- ty environment, Brazil’s experience in diversifying external economic relations, strengthening domes- tic capabilities, and preserving strategic autonomy oers valuable lessons for Vietnam in the context of intensifying great-power competition. The policy implications for Vietnam are drawn from Brazil’s experience because both countries share important characteristics, including a high degree of economic openness, deep integration into glo- bal value chains, and growing exposure to great- power competition. Vietnam’s close economic ties with both the United States and China also expose it to risks arising from trade tensions, technologi- cal fragmentation, and changes in global supply chains. These similarities make Brazil’s experience particularly relevant for informing Vietnam’s eorts to diversify external economic relations and stren- gthen its strategic autonomy. This approach is also reected in Vietnam’s active participation in multi- ple free trade agreements and its engagement in ASEAN, demonstrating its eorts to diversify eco- nomic partnerships and maintain strategic exibility amid major-power competition. This study focuses on the period from 2014 to 2025. The year 2014 is chosen as the starting point be- cause it marked a new phase in Brazil-China eco- nomic relations, characterized by the expansion of trade, investment, and nancial cooperation within the BRICS framework, which laid the foundation for the subsequent intensication of geoeconomic competition between the United States and China in Brazil. The year 2014 also marked a turning point in Brazil’s domestic economy, as growth began to weaken after a period supported by favorable ex- ternal conditions and high commodity prices. The subsequent recession in 2015-2016 increased the importance of foreign markets, investment, and - nancing, while reinforcing Brazil’s need to maintain diversied economic relations with both China and the United States. Against this backdrop, the article addresses two main research questions: (1) What geoeconomic instruments have the United States and China em- ployed to expand or maintain their inuence in Brazil during the period 2014-2025? and (2) What policy implications can Vietnam draw from Brazil’s experience to strengthen its strategic autonomy and better adapt to intensifying geoeconomic com- petition between major powers? Accordingly, the article aims to analyze the geoeconomic strategies 259 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga of the United States and China in Brazil, assess Bra- zil’s responses to the competition between the two powers, and propose several policy implications for Vietnam. Given its focus on the Brazilian case, this study does not seek to compare Brazil with other Latin Ameri- can countries, nor does it provide a comprehensive analysis of Brazil’s domestic political and social dy- namics. Instead, the analysis concentrates on geoe- conomic competition and foreign policy, with the objective of drawing lessons that may be relevant for Vietnam. Literature Review Competition between the United States and China in Latin America, particularly in Brazil, has attrac- ted increasing scholarly attention over the past two decades. China's growing economic inuence, together with the strategic adjustments made by the United States, has generated diverse analytical perspectives seeking to explain the nature, drivers, and implications of great-power competition in the region. Broadly speaking, the existing literature can be classied into four major strands: (i) US–China geoeconomic competition in Latin America; (ii) Chi- na's expanding economic inuence in Brazil; (iii) US strategic adjustments and Brazil's responses; and (iv) dependency theory perspectives on the chan- ging international economic order. The rst strand examines the intensifying compe- tition between the United States and China across Latin America. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2008) argue that the rapid expansion of Chinese trade, investment, and lending has fundamentally resha- ped the external economic structures of many Latin American countries while simultaneously challen- ging the United States' traditional position in the region. Jenkins (2019) further contends that Chi- na's rise has not only altered global trade ows but also accelerated the restructuring of regional value chains and investment patterns in Latin America. According to Ellis (2009), US–China competition extends well beyond trade, encompassing infras- tructure investment, energy, nance, technology, and other strategic industries. From a develop- ment perspective, Wise (2020) argues that China's growing presence has created new opportunities for investment and market access while simultaneously confronting Latin American countries with the cha- llenge of strengthening industrial capabilities and avoiding a development model overly dependent on commodity exports. Within this broader context, Brazil has emerged as one of the principal arenas of geoeconomic com- petition between the two powers. Abreu (2005) was among the rst scholars to demonstrate that China's rise signicantly transformed Brazil's trade structure through rapidly growing demand for agri- cultural commodities and raw materials. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2008) argue that China - Brazil economic relations reect Beijing's long-term stra- tegy of securing access to strategic resources while expanding overseas markets for Chinese goods and enterprises. Jenkins (2019) likewise identies Brazil as a central component of China's strategy in Latin America due to its large domestic market, abundant natural resources, and increasingly inuential posi- tion within BRICS. More recent studies indicate that geoeconomic competition has expanded beyond trade to encom- pass foreign direct investment and strategic sectors of the economy. Dalla Costa, Bandeira, and Ferrari (2019) show that Chinese investment in Brazil in- creased substantially after 2010, gradually shifting from natural resource extraction toward electricity generation, oil and gas, logistics, and manufactu- ring. Torres (2020) argues that Chinese enterprises have increasingly concentrated their investments in strategic infrastructure sectors in order to establi- sh long-term economic inuence. Barbosa (2021) identies the electricity sector as one of the primary destinations for Chinese investment in Brazil, whi- le Garcia et al. (2023) emphasize the importance of investment facilitation mechanisms and policy coordination in expanding the presence of Chinese 260 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga rms. From a trade perspective, Zhao et al. (2023) nd that although China and Brazil exhibit highly complementary trade structures, this relationship has also reinforced Brazil's dependence on exports of low-value-added agricultural and mineral com- modities. A second strand of research focuses on US strate- gic adjustments and Brazil's responses to China's expanding inuence. Malamud (2017) argues that relations among Brazil, the United States, and China have evolved into a triangular framework in which Brazil is not merely an object of great-power com- petition but also an active actor capable of levera- ging rivalry between the two powers to advance its national interests. Recent US policy documents - including the National Security Strategy (2022, 2025), as well as reports issued by the Oce of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the US Department of Commerce, and the US Department of State - demonstrate that Washington increasin- gly regards Brazil as an important partner in supply chains, critical minerals, digital transformation, and clean energy as part of broader eorts to reduce dependence on China. Meanwhile, recent analyses by Alves (2025) and Franco (2025) indicate that Brazil has continued expanding cooperation with China in trade and investment while maintaining close relations with the United States in technology, nance, and innovation. More recently, Cook et al. (2025) argue that Brazil has adopted a exible stra- tegy aimed at balancing its interests between the two major powers rather than aligning exclusively with either side. Beyond the international political economy lite- rature, numerous Latin American scholars have approached this issue through the lens of depen- dency theory. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argue that the development of Latin American economies has historically been embedded within asymmetric relationships in the international economic system, causing industrialization to remain heavily inuen- ced by external centers of power. Dos Santos (1970) conceptualizes dependency as an outcome of the dynamics of global capitalism, while Marini (1991) emphasizes "super-exploitation of labor" as a de- ning characteristic of dependent capitalism in La- tin America. Bambirra (1978) further develops this perspective by arguing that changes in economic partners do not necessarily eliminate dependency but may simply represent a shift from one center of power to another. Although these theoretical pers- pectives emerged during the Cold War, they conti- nue to provide valuable analytical insights into whe- ther China's expanding inuence represents a new form of dependency for Brazil or instead creates greater development opportunities for emerging economies. Overall, the existing literature has signicantly ad- vanced our understanding of US–China competition in Latin America and Brazil's role within this process. Nevertheless, most studies concentrate on bilateral relationships or individual sectors such as trade, in- vestment, or energy. Comprehensive analyses that simultaneously examine the geoeconomic strate- gies of both the United States and China in Brazil, assess how Brazil has leveraged great-power com- petition to advance its development objectives, and derive policy implications for emerging economies such as Vietnam remain relatively limited. This re- search gap provides the foundation for the present study, which approaches Brazil as a case study to analyze US - China geoeconomic competition and propose policy implications for Vietnam. 3. Research Methodology and Theoretical Fra- mework This study adopts a qualitative research approach, combining document analysis and synthesis, case study, and comparative analysis to examine the characteristics, objectives, and implications of geoeconomic competition between the United States and China in Brazil. Document analysis and synthesis are employed to systematize the theore- tical foundations and review the existing literature on the strategies of the United States, China, and Brazil. The sources include academic publications, 261 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga scholarly books, reports issued by international or- ganizations, and ocial policy documents, such as the US National Security Strategy (2022, 2025), re- ports published by the Oce of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the US Department of Commerce, the US Department of State, the Cen- tral Bank of Brazil, the BRICS Policy Center, AidDa- ta, and other reliable statistical databases. Brazil is selected as the case study to examine the interaction between the geoeconomic strategies of the United States and China and the responses of the recipient country. As the largest economy in La- tin America, China's leading trading partner in the region, and a country that maintains close econo- mic and investment relations with the United States, Brazil provides an appropriate case for analyzing contemporary geoeconomic competition between major powers. Comparative analysis is employed to examine the objectives, instruments, and imple- mentation of the geoeconomic strategies pursued by the United States and China in Brazil. It is also used to assess changes in US policy under the Bi- den and Trump administrations, thereby providing a basis for drawing policy implications for Vietnam. Regarding the theoretical framework, the study draws upon the geoeconomic approach developed by Blackwill and Harris (2016), which argues that states employ economic instruments- including tra- de, investment, nance, technology, energy, and su- pply chains-to pursue strategic objectives and ex- pand their international inuence. This framework provides the analytical foundation for examining the geoeconomic instruments employed by the Uni- ted States and China in Brazil. The study also applies hedging theory to explain Brazil's responses to competition between the two major powers. According to Goh (2005), middle powers typically combine multiple policy instru- ments to minimize risks while preserving their stra- tegic autonomy. Kuik (2008) argues that hedging enables states to avoid making a denitive choice between competing major powers, whereas Lim and Cooper (2015) emphasize the importance of maintaining strategic exibility and avoiding exces- sive dependence on any single partner. From this perspective, Brazil is viewed as pursuing a hedging strategy by expanding economic cooperation with China while simultaneously maintaining close rela- tions with the United States in technology, innova- tion, and the energy transition. In addition, the study draws on the concept of stra- tegic autonomy to derive policy implications for Vietnam. According to Beaucillon (2023), strategic autonomy refers to a state's ability to strengthen its capacity for independent action while maintai- ning international cooperation. Vu, Ngo, and Ngu- yen (2024) conceptualize strategic autonomy as a multidimensional concept closely associated with strengthening domestic capabilities and diversif- ying external relations. Building on these perspecti- ves, this study uses Brazil's experience as a referen- ce for proposing policy implications for Vietnam in its eorts to build an independent and self-reliant economy while pursuing comprehensive and deep international integration. DEVELOPMENT 4. The United States' and China's Strategies for Ac- cessing the Brazilian Market 4.1. The United States' Strategy toward the Brazi- lian Market Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America, en- dowed with abundant natural resources, a large consumer market, and a strategic position in global supply chains for minerals, energy, and agricultural commodities. Given these advantages, Brazil has become one of the United States' most important economic partners in the Western Hemisphere. Against the backdrop of China's rapidly expanding economic inuence in Latin America, the United States has sought to maintain its position in Brazil through trade, investment, technology, and nance. Unlike a strategy centered on resource extraction, 262 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga the United States prioritizes high-value-added sec- tors such as digital technology, nancial services, advanced manufacturing, and high-tech agriculture. To achieve these objectives, the United States has promoted the presence of its enterprises in sectors where it enjoys comparative advantages. In infor- mation technology, US rms provide digital infras- tructure, software, and digital transformation solu- tions for the Brazilian market (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2024). In the nancial sector, the Uni- ted States has strengthened cooperation between nancial institutions and the Brazilian market to facilitate business investment and commercial ex- pansion (U.S. Department of State, 2024). In agri- culture, bilateral cooperation has focused on tech- nology transfer, mechanization, and the application of digital technologies to enhance agricultural pro- ductivity and competitiveness. Over the past decade, the United States has gra- dually strengthened the institutional framework governing bilateral economic relations. The Agree- ment on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ATEC), which entered into force in 2011, focuses on redu- cing non-tari barriers and improving the business environment. This was followed by the Protocol Re- lating to Trade Rules and Transparency, signed in 2020 and entering into force in 2022, which intro- duced provisions on trade facilitation, transparency, and anti-corruption measures, thereby creating a more favorable business environment for US com- panies operating in Brazil. Consequently, bilateral trade maintained an upward trajectory during the 2014-2025 period. Brazil's ex- ports to the United States increased from US$27.1 billion in 2014 to US$38.1 billion in 2025 (UN Com- trade, 2026). Brazil’s trade with the United States covers a relatively wide range of products, from primary commodities to manufactured goods. In 2024, ve major export items - oil, semi-nished iron and steel products, pig iron, coee, and airpla- nes - made up nearly 40% of Brazil’s total exports to the U.S. Brazil’s imports from the U.S. were more diversied, with machinery and equipment, fuel oils, airplanes, and natural gas together accounting for about 34% of total imports (Banco Central do Brasil, 2025). The composition of bilateral trade points to a clear degree of complementarity between the two economies. Brazil mainly supplies commodities and industrial inputs, whereas the United States exports a broader range of machinery, energy products, and technology-intensive goods. This pattern also reects dierences in the two countries’ production structures, as Brazil remains relatively more depen- dent on resource-based exports, while the United States has a stronger presence in higher-value-ad- ded manufacturing and technology-intensive indus- tries. FDI remains another key instrument through which the United States consolidates its economic pre- sence in Brazil. According to 2023 data, the United States was the largest foreign investor in Brazil, with an FDI stock of approximately US$87.9 billion, concentrated in software and information technolo- gy services, nancial services, food and beverages, chemicals, and telecommunications. Meanwhile, Brazilian FDI in the United States totaled approxi- mately US$31.8 billion, primarily in the energy, food, and chemical industries (SelectUSA, 2024). The substantial investment gap reects the United Sta- tes' dominant position in bilateral investment rela- tions as well as the attractiveness of the Brazilian market for US enterprises. Notably, US investment has been directed mainly toward technology-inten- sive and high-value-added industries through joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and the expan- sion of production facilities. These investments have strengthened the presence of US rms in techno- logy, nance, and service sectors while integrating Brazil more closely into global value chains led by the United States. Overall, the United States' strategy toward Brazil has been implemented through a combination of institutional frameworks, trade, and investment. Trade enables the United States to sustain export markets for high-technology products while secu- 263 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga ring supplies of strategic raw materials, whereas fo- reign direct investment reinforces the position of US rms in high-value-added industries. This approach reects the United States' comparative advantages in technology, nance, and innovation while helping preserve its economic inuence in Latin America's largest economy amid intensifying competition with China. 4.2. China's Strategy toward the Brazilian Market Following its accession to the World Trade Organi- zation (WTO) in 2001, China gradually implemen- ted a strategy aimed at becoming a global trading power by expanding export markets, securing ac- cess to strategic raw materials, and promoting ou- tward foreign investment. Within this strategy, Bra- zil occupies a particularly important position due to its status as the largest economy in Latin America, its abundant natural resources, and its increasingly signicant role in global supply chains. Consequent- ly, China has regarded Brazil as a priority partner for securing supplies of strategic resources while simul- taneously expanding markets for Chinese goods, investment, and cooperation in infrastructure, tech- nology, and nance (Li, 2012). China-Brazil relations have been progressively strengthened through a series of institutional up- grades, from the establishment of diplomatic rela- tions in 1974, to the strategic partnership in 1993, and nally the comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. Against this institutional backdrop, bilate- ral trade has expanded rapidly. Since 2009, China has surpassed the United States to become Brazil's largest trading partner and, since 2012, its largest source of imports (Franco, 2025). During the period 2014-2025, Brazil's exports to China increased from US$40.6 billion to US$100 billion, while its imports from China rose from US$39.4 billion to US$75.9 bi- llion (United Nations Statistics Division, 2026). Brazil’s trade with China is heavily concentrated in a few commodity products. In 2024, soybeans, oil, iron ore, beef, and cellulose together accounted for about 90% of Brazil’s exports to China, which totaled USD 94 billion. Imports from China were considerably more diverse. Electric vehicles, tele- communications equipment, chemicals, and solar panels accounted for around 22% of Brazil’s total imports from the country (Banco Central do Brasil, 2025). The two sides therefore have quite dierent export proles. Brazil mainly supplies agricultural products, minerals, and other commodities to the Chinese market, while China exports a wider range of manufactured and technology-related goods to Brazil. This dierence is also reected in the broader structure of bilateral trade, with Brazil relying more on commodity exports and China playing a larger role in the supply of industrial and technology-in- tensive products. In addition to trade, FDI has become a key instru- ment through which China has expanded its econo- mic presence in Brazil. Following the implementa- tion of the "Going Out" strategy and, in particular, the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Chinese investment has extended beyond se- curing access to natural resources to encompass infrastructure, logistics, energy, and technology, thereby broadening China's long-term economic inuence (Garcia et al., 2023). Chinese investment accelerated signicantly after the 2008 global - nancial crisis, and from the early 2010s onward Bra- zil emerged as one of China's most important FDI destinations in Latin America (Dalla Costa, Bandei- ra, & Ferrari, 2019). During the initial phase, Chinese investment was concentrated in mining, oil and gas, and agricultu- re in order to secure supplies of iron ore, crude oil, and soybeans. At the same time, this investment pattern reinforced Brazil's specialization in primary commodity exports (Abreu, 2005). In recent years, however, Chinese investment has shifted markedly toward infrastructure, logistics, renewable energy, technology, and manufacturing, reecting China's objective of expanding its presence in higher-va- lue-added industries while strengthening its control over strategic supply chains (Torres, 2020). Major 264 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga Chinese corporations-including State Grid, China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG), China General Nuclear Power (CGN), SPIC, Huawei, ZTE, BYD, and DiDi Chuxing - have invested extensively in clean energy, electricity transmission, logistics, and digi- tal technologies. In particular, BYD's electric vehicle manufacturing plant in Camaçari illustrates China's growing emphasis on advanced manufacturing and high-technology industries (Barbosa, 2021; BYD, 2023; Lou Yu, 2024). This investment expansion has been supported by state-owned nancial institu- tions such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim- bank), which have provided nancing for large-sca- le projects and facilitated China's long-term econo- mic presence in Brazil (Garcia et al., 2023). Overall, China's strategy toward Brazil has been implemented through a combination of trade and investment. While trade serves to secure strate- gic raw materials and expand markets for Chinese manufactured goods, investment enables China to strengthen its presence in infrastructure, energy, te- chnology, and other strategic sectors. Through this integrated approach, China has not only expanded its economic interests but also increased its inuen- ce in Latin America's largest economy, thereby in- tensifying geoeconomic competition with the Uni- ted States in Brazil. 5. Geoeconomic Competition between the United States and China in Brazil and Its Impacts on Brazil 5.1. Geoeconomic Competition between the United States and China in Brazil The case of Brazil demonstrates that competition between the United States and China extends be- yond trade volumes or investment ows to encom- pass the ability to establish and shape strategica- lly signicant economic networks. According to the geoeconomic approach proposed by Blackwill and Harris (2016), states employ economic instru- ments-including trade, investment, nance, techno- logy, and supply chains-to pursue geopolitical ob- jectives. In Brazil, both the United States and China have relied on these instruments to maintain and expand their inuence, although dierences in their resource endowments, development models, and implementation strategies have resulted in two dis- tinct geoeconomic approaches. Competition between the United States and China in Brazil reects the contrast between two dierent models of exercising economic inuence. The United States primarily relies on its comparative advanta- ges in technology, nance, innovation, and the glo- bal reach of its multinational corporations. Throu- gh foreign direct investment, technology transfer, nancial services, and cooperation in sectors such as the digital economy, clean energy, and high-tech manufacturing, the United States maintains its in- uence by participating in the highest value-added segments of global value chains. In other words, the principal geoeconomic instrument of the United States lies in its capacity to provide technological capabilities, knowledge, and institutional resources, thereby shaping development standards and Bra- zil's integration into the global economy. In contrast, China has pursued a geoeconomic strate- gy based on the combination of trade, infrastructure investment, and the nancial capacity of state-ow- ned enterprises. Becoming Brazil's largest trading partner has enabled China to establish a central posi- tion within Brazil's export network, particularly with respect to iron ore, soybeans, and crude oil. At the same time, through investments in energy, logistics, telecommunications, electric vehicles, and green te- chnologies, China has gradually expanded its presen- ce from trade into sectors that are strategically im- portant for Brazil's long-term development. Whereas the United States exerts inuence primarily through technology and institutions, China enhances its in- uence through large-scale nancing, infrastructure development, and the integration of Brazil into pro- duction networks led by China. These contrasting approaches indicate that geoe- conomic competition in Brazil is not simply about 265 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga determining which country is the larger trading partner, but rather about competing for strategic positions within global value chains. China enjoys advantages in securing export markets for Brazil's primary commodities while supplying competiti- vely priced manufactured goods. The United States, by contrast, retains comparative advantages in high technology, nance, and innovation. This has crea- ted a relationship characterized by both competi- tion and complementarity, whereby Brazil depends on the Chinese market to sustain its exports while simultaneously relying on U.S. technology and in- vestment to enhance its productive capacity. Nevertheless, competition between the two powers has not reduced Brazil to a passive arena of geopoli- tical rivalry. Instead, Brazil's response clearly reects the hedging strategy identied by Goh (2005), Kuik (2008), and Lim and Cooper (2015) as a common approach adopted by middle powers operating in environments characterized by great-power compe- tition. Rather than pursuing hard balancing against one side or aligning exclusively with a single major power, Brazil has maintained cooperative relations with both the United States and China in order to maximize economic benets while minimizing stra- tegic risks. Continuing to expand trade with China while preserving cooperation with the United States in technology, investment, and innovation illustrates Brazil's exible approach to safeguarding its policy autonomy. Brazil's hedging strategy also highlights the critical importance of domestic capabilities in leveraging great-power competition. Its abundant natural re- sources, large domestic market, and active parti- cipation in international institutions such as BRICS and the G20 have strengthened Brazil's bargaining position and enabled it to preserve a relatively high degree of strategic exibility. Nevertheless, Brazil's ability to benet from U.S.–China competition re- mains constrained by structural weaknesses within its economy. Heavy dependence on commodity exports to China risks reinforcing a development model based on natural resource advantages rather than promoting industrial upgrading. At the same time, technological competition between the Uni- ted States and China presents Brazil with increa- singly complex choices concerning technological standards, data security, and digital transformation. From the perspective of strategic autonomy, Brazil's experience demonstrates that maintaining indepen- dence in an environment of great-power competi- tion does not require reducing engagement with major partners. Rather, it depends on diversifying external relations, strengthening domestic capabili- ties, and selectively choosing areas of cooperation that best serve national interests. As emphasized by Beaucillon (2023) and Vu, Ngo, and Nguyen (2024), strategic autonomy should not be understood as isolation from global economic networks, but as the capacity to participate in them from a more autono- mous and proactive position. Overall, geoeconomic competition between the Uni- ted States and China in Brazil reects the broader transformation from traditional power competition toward competition through strategic economic resources. Both countries seek not only to expand market access but also to shape future trade, in- vestment, technological, and supply-chain networ- ks. For Brazil, this competition has generated both opportunities to access external resources for de- velopment and new forms of economic dependen- ce. Brazil's experience suggests that the benets of great-power competition can only be translated into sustainable development when the recipient country maintains a balanced foreign policy, streng- thens its domestic capabilities, and pursues a long- term development strategy aligned with its national interests. 5.2. Impacts on Brazil Geoeconomic competition between the United Sta- tes and China has generated profound impacts on Brazil. While creating new opportunities for trade and investment, it has also reshaped the country's domestic distribution of economic interests and 266 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga posed new challenges for its national development strategy. As the largest economy in Latin Ameri- ca and a country maintaining close economic ties with both the United States and China, Brazil has been able to benet from the rivalry between the two powers while simultaneously facing increasing pressure to sustain economic growth and preser- ve its strategic autonomy. According to Cook et al. (2024), U.S.–China competition has enhanced Brazil's strategic importance in the foreign policies of both Washington and Beijing, while making the country's development environment increasingly complex. From an economic perspective, trade tensions be- tween the United States and China-particularly sin- ce 2018-together with China's imposition of taris on a wide range of U.S. products and its eorts to diversify sources of food and raw materials to stren- gthen resource security, have signicantly increased Chinese demand for Brazilian products such as soy- beans, iron ore, crude oil, and beef. Consequently, exports and investment in agriculture, mining, and logistics have expanded considerably. Casagrande, Mallmann, and Feistel (2026) argue that U.S.–China competition has generated a trade diversion eect that enabled Brazil to expand its export market share in several sectors where it enjoys compara- tive advantages. However, these gains have been largely short-term and concentrated in primary commodities, while exports of manufactured goods and high-technology products have shown limited improvement. At the same time, Brazil's growing dependence on the Chinese market has increased its vulnerability to uctuations in Chinese demand and changes in trade relations between the major powers. Meanwhile, the United States has remained Brazil's principal partner in foreign direct invest- ment, advanced technology, nance, and innova- tion. The benets and costs of this competition have not been distributed evenly across domestic interest groups. The agribusiness, mining, and logistics sec- tors have been the principal beneciaries of rising Chinese demand for agricultural products and raw materials. Although agriculture accounts for only approximately 6.8 percent of Brazil's GDP, it con- tributes nearly 42 percent of the country's total ex- ports, underscoring its increasingly important role in the national economy (OECD, 2024). By contrast, many manufacturing industries have faced greater competitive pressures due to relatively low produc- tivity, limited value-added production, and the on- going restructuring of global supply chains. At the same time, rms operating in technology, nance, and aerospace have continued to maintain close partnerships with the United States in order to gain access to capital, advanced technologies, and inter- national markets. These divergent interests among domestic economic sectors have created signicant policy challenges for the Brazilian government as it seeks to balance the promotion of commodity ex- ports with the development of higher-value-added industries. Against this backdrop, geoeconomic competition between the United States and China has also en- couraged Brazil to adjust its development model by strengthening national competitiveness and reducing excessive dependence on primary com- modity exports. While continuing to capitalize on its comparative advantages in natural resources and agriculture, Brazil has increasingly recognized the need to promote innovation, expand advanced manufacturing, foster high-technology industries, and develop a highly skilled workforce in order to integrate more deeply into global value chains. These eorts are essential for enhancing Brazil's resilience and its capacity to adapt to the evol- ving dynamics of geoeconomic competition in the years ahead. 5.3. Brazil's Experience in Responding to U.S. - Chi- na Geoeconomic Competition Brazil's experience in responding to geoeconomic competition between the United States and China demonstrates that eectively leveraging opportu- nities arising from the external environment must 267 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga be accompanied by the strengthening of domestic capabilities in order to ensure sustainable growth and preserve policy autonomy. From the perspective of dependency theory, Bra- zil's experience highlights the structural risks asso- ciated with maintaining a high level of dependence on exports of primary commodities and agricultural products. Rising Chinese demand for imports, to- gether with the trade diversion eects generated by U.S.–China competition, has stimulated export growth and generated substantial revenues for Bra- zil's commercial agricultural sector. However, these benets have simultaneously reinforced a resour- ce-based growth model, slowed the diversication of the country's economic structure, constrained the development of higher-value-added industries, and increased Brazil's vulnerability to uctuations in international markets (Casagrande, Mallmann, & Feistel, 2026; OECD, 2024). This suggests that the opportunities created by great-power competition can only generate sustainable long-term benets when they are accompanied by strategies aimed at strengthening productive capacity, promoting te- chnological innovation, and developing industries with higher value-added. From the perspective of hedging theory, Brazil de- monstrates that emerging economies can preserve policy space and maximize national interests by di- versifying their relationships with major powers ra- ther than aligning exclusively with a single partner. Brazil has continued to maintain China as its princi- pal export market and a major source of investment in infrastructure and energy, while simultaneously preserving close cooperation with the United Sta- tes in high technology, nance, innovation, and eco- nomic governance (Goh, 2005; Kuik, 2008). This approach not only reduces the risks associated with excessive dependence on a single partner but also enables Brazil to capitalize on the complementary advantages oered by both major powers, thereby preserving strategic exibility and enhancing its resilience in an increasingly uncertain international economic environment. More importantly, the Brazilian case demonstrates that strategic autonomy is not achieved through disengagement from global economic networks. Rather, it is built upon the combination of proac- tive international integration and the continuous strengthening of domestic development capabili- ties. Strategic autonomy is reected in a country's ability to preserve independent decision-making, diversify its external partnerships, and enhance the competitiveness of its economy amid intensi- fying great-power competition (Beaucillon, 2023; Vu, Ngo, & Nguyen, 2024). By leveraging its role in multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the G20, while simultaneously promoting domestic reforms to strengthen industrial capacity, foster innovation, and improve infrastructure, Brazil has gradually ex- panded its strategic room for maneuver and mitiga- ted the pressures arising from great-power rivalry. This experience suggests that, for Vietnam, geoeco- nomic competition among major powers can serve as a catalyst for long-term development only when embedded within a national development strategy centered on strengthening domestic capabilities, promoting innovation, diversifying external econo- mic relations, and progressively moving up global value chains. Only on this foundation can strategic autonomy be realized as a substantive development capacity rather than merely an objective of foreign policy. 6. Policy Implications for Vietnam Although Brazil and Vietnam dier signicantly in terms of territorial size, geopolitical position, and economic structure, both are developing economies with a high degree of openness and are increasin- gly aected by geoeconomic competition among major powers. Vietnam remains committed to an independent and self-reliant foreign policy while pursuing the diversication and multilateralization of its external relations. At the same time, it seeks to build an independent and self-reliant economy integrated with comprehensive, deep, and eective international integration. In recent years, alongside the deepening of international integration, the need 268 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga to strengthen strategic autonomy has been increa- singly emphasized in the Party's and the State's po- licy documents. In this context, strategic autonomy does not imply reducing international integration or minimizing interdependence within the global economy. Rather, it refers to strengthening domes- tic capabilities to respond proactively to external shocks while preserving the exibility to cooperate with multiple partners on the basis of national inte- rests. This orientation is clearly reected in Resolu- tion No.59-NQ/TW (2025) of the Politburo, which emphasizes the need to build an independent and self-reliant economy alongside proactive, compre- hensive, and eective international integration, whi- le strengthening national resilience and strategic autonomy amid an increasingly complex internatio- nal environment. The characteristics of Vietnam's economy make this objective particularly important. Vietnam is one of the world's most open economies, with manufacturing and exports serving as the principal engines of economic growth. The United States is currently Vietnam's lar- gest export market and an important partner in invest- ment, technology, and innovation. China, meanwhile, is Vietnam's largest trading partner and the principal supplier of raw materials, machinery, equipment, and intermediate inputs for domestic production. These close economic ties with both economies have ena- bled Vietnam to expand its markets, attract foreign in- vestment, and integrate more deeply into global value chains. At the same time, however, they have increased Vietnam's vulnerability to the evolving dynamics of geoeconomic competition between the United States and China. Therefore, Brazil should not be regarded as a model that can be directly replicated in Vietnam. Ra- ther, it serves as a valuable case study that illustrates both the opportunities and the challenges confronting a developing economy seeking to maintain close rela- tions with the world's two largest economic powers. Against this background, this study proposes several policy implications for Vietnam. First, Vietnam should continue to uphold its poli- cy of independence, self-reliance, multilateraliza- tion, and diversication of external relations while exibly utilizing external economic instruments to safeguard national interests. Brazil's experience de- monstrates that maintaining cooperative relations with both the United States and China can broaden policy space, enable access to resources from mul- tiple partners, and reduce the pressure to align ex- clusively with either major power. However, such a balancing strategy can only be sustained when a country is capable of clearly identifying its core na- tional interests and managing its external relations with strategic exibility. For Vietnam, strengthening participation in multilateral cooperation mechanis- ms, maximizing the benets of next-generation free trade agreements such as the CPTPP, EVFTA, and RCEP, while expanding partnerships with emerging economies, would contribute to diversifying deve- lopment opportunities and mitigating the risks ari- sing from great-power competition. Second, Vietnam should further diversify its export markets, supply chains, and sources of foreign in- vestment in order to strengthen the resilience of its economy. The Brazilian case demonstrates that ex- cessive dependence on commodity exports to Chi- na may stimulate trade growth in the short term but also increase vulnerability to uctuations in interna- tional demand and commodity prices. For Vietnam, the key lesson extends beyond expanding export markets to include the diversication of sources of raw materials, intermediate goods, and technolo- gies essential for domestic production. Alongside maintaining stable economic relations with both the United States and China, Vietnam should make greater eorts to expand economic cooperation with markets in Latin America, the Middle East, Afri- ca, and South Asia, while encouraging domestic en- terprises to integrate more deeply into regional and global supply chains in order to reduce dependence on any single market or partner. Third, Vietnam should strengthen its domestic capabilities as the foundation of strategic auto- nomy. Geoeconomic competition between the United States and China has expanded beyond 269 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga trade into such areas as advanced technology, data governance, articial intelligence, semicon- ductors, clean energy, critical minerals, and su- pply chains. Under these circumstances, a coun- try's competitiveness depends not only on its ability to attract foreign investment but also on its scientic and technological capabilities, in- novation capacity, and the quality of its human resources. Brazil's experience suggests that subs- tantial inows of foreign capital do not automati- cally generate sustainable competitiveness if the economy continues to rely primarily on exports of low-value-added products. Accordingly, Vietnam should continue to prioritize the development of high-technology industries, semiconductors, articial intelligence, renewable energy, and su- pporting industries. At the same time, stronger linkages between domestic enterprises and fo- reign-invested rms are needed to increase lo- cal content and gradually move Vietnamese in- dustries toward higher-value-added segments of global value chains. Fourth, Vietnam should strengthen its economic strategic autonomy by enhancing its capacity for fo- recasting and managing risks arising from changes in the international environment. Brazil's experience illustrates that competition among major powers creates not only opportunities for trade expansion and investment attraction but also pressures related to technology, nance, trade standards, and supply chain security. Vietnam should therefore establish more eective mechanisms for monitoring geoeco- nomic trends and assessing the potential impacts of the trade, investment, and technology policies of major powers on the domestic economy. In addition, closer coordination among government agencies, businesses, and research institutions is essential for designing timely and eective policy responses. At the same time, Vietnam should continue improving its market institutions, upgrading the quality of hu- man resources, fostering innovation, and strengthe- ning the competitiveness of domestic enterprises in order to enhance the economy's resilience against external shocks. Nevertheless, the lessons drawn from Brazil must be interpreted in light of the signicant dieren- ces between the two countries. Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America, endowed with abundant natural resources, a member of BRICS, and occupies a distinct regional position. Vietnam, by contrast, is an export-oriented economy that depends more heavily on manufacturing and processing industries and is located in the Indo-Pacic, where strategic competition among major powers is considerably more intense. Consequently, the Brazilian experien- ce should not be viewed as a model to be applied directly. Rather, it provides useful insights into how a developing economy can leverage great-power competition to expand its development opportuni- ties while strengthening strategic autonomy and sa- feguarding national interests. For Vietnam, the key challenge is not to choose between major powers, but to build sucient domestic capabilities to en- gage proactively with all partners on the basis of national interests and the objective of sustainable development. Vietnam’s active participation in multiple free trade agreements and its engagement in ASEAN illustrate this approach, allowing the country to expand eco- nomic partnerships while maintaining room for in- dependent policy choices. This experience is consis- tent with the lesson from Brazil that diversication and strategic exibility are essential for preserving autonomy amid intensifying major-power competi- tion. CONCLUSIONS The geoeconomic competition between the United States and China in Brazil reects the transformation of power competition in today’s global economy, where economic instruments have increasingly be- come key means for major powers to maintain and expand their inuence. Drawing on the geoecono- mic framework developed by Blackwill and Harris (2016), this study demonstrates that the United States and China have adopted distinct approaches toward Brazil. While the United States primarily re- 270 ISSN 2707-7330 Revista POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL | Volumen VIII, Nro. 4 octubre-diciembre de 2026 US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam Van Nga lies on its comparative advantages in technology, nance, innovation, and global business networks to maintain its position in high value-added sectors, China has expanded its inuence through large-sca- le trade, infrastructure investment, energy coopera- tion, and nancial capacity, thereby strengthening its role in strategic supply chains. These dierences indicate that geoeconomic competition extends be- yond market access to encompass the shaping of future production networks, technological ecosys- tems, and development standards. The study also nds that Brazil has not remained a passive actor in the competition between the two major powers. Instead, it has pursued a hedging stra- tegy, maintaining cooperative relations with both the United States and China while maximizing economic benets and preserving strategic autonomy in poli- cymaking. However, Brazil’s experience demonstra- tes that the benets derived from major-power com- petition can only be sustained when accompanied by stronger domestic capabilities, diversied external economic relations, and reduced dependence on any single partner or development model. From a theoretical perspective, the ndings sug- gest that geoeconomic competition among major powers extends beyond trade, investment, and - nancial relations to inuence the productive capabi- lities, technological development, and policy space of developing countries.The Brazilian case shows that hedging can help countries navigate compe- tition among major powers, capitalize on emerging opportunities, limit the risks of excessive depen- dence, and preserve room for independent poli- cy choices. This indicates that strategic autonomy does not mean reducing international integration, but rather requires diversifying external economic relations, strengthening domestic capabilities, and maintaining the capacity to adapt. This approach is also consistent with Vietnam’s orientation toward strategic autonomy, building an independent and self-reliant economy in conjunction with internatio- nal integration, and promoting science, technology, and innovation. For Vietnam, the Brazilian case oers valuable policy insights in the context of intensifying geoeconomic competition among major powers. Although Bra- zil’s experience cannot be directly replicated due to dierences in economic scale, geopolitical position, and industrial structure, it highlights the importan- ce of maintaining an independent and self-reliant foreign policy; diversifying markets, supply chains, and investment sources; and strengthening domes- tic scientic and technological capabilities, inno- vation, and economic competitiveness. In the long term, a country’s ability to adapt to major-power competition depends not on aligning with any particular power, but on its capacity to participate proactively in global economic networks, safeguard national interests, and preserve strategic autonomy throughout its development process. This study is subject to the limitations of a qualita- tive single-case design based primarily on secon- dary sources. Accordingly, its ndings should be interpreted as analytical insights rather than broad- ly generalizable conclusions. 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