Entre la necesidad y la oportunidad. El acercamiento entre China y el Emirato Islámico de Afganistán (2021-2025)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17305751Palabras clave:
China, Afganistán, movimiento Talibán, geopolítica, geoestrategiaResumen
En agosto de 2021, la victoria talibán y la instauración del Emirato Islámico de Afganistán generaron una profunda crisis socioeconómica y una situación de aislamiento internacional. Ante este escenario, la República Popular China (RPCh) implementó una estrategia acercamiento diplomático, político y económico hacia el país surasiático. Este artículo analiza dicho fenómeno, destacando la imperiosa necesidad de colaboración internacional del Emirato y los intereses económicos geoestratégicos de China en Afganistán como factores determinantes. La asociación con China representa una oportunidad estratégica para los intereses afganos en las esferas económica, política e internacional, dado que la posición geopolítica de Afganistán facilita el acceso de Beijing a mercados clave en Oriente Medio, Asia Central, Asia Meridional y Europa, y sus recursos naturales son vitales para la industria china. No obstante, la plena materialización de estas posibilidades se ve limitada por los persistentes riesgos de seguridad en la nación afgana.
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