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RNPS: No. 2092

Vol. VIII, No. 4 (octubre-diciembre) | 2026

Ph.D. Le Thi Van Nga

Doctor of Philosophy (International Economics). Director and researcher of the Center for Latin American Studies,

Institute for European and Americas Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam.

pevannga@

gmail.com

0009-0001-5864-8470

Cómo citar (APA, séptima edición): Van Nga, L. T. (2026). US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Impli-

cations for Vietnam. Política Internacional, VIII (Nro. 4).

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22098138

RECEIVED: JULY 22, 2026

APPROVED: SEPTEMBER 3rd, 2026

PUBLISHED: OCTOBER 19TH, 2026

US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications

for Vietnam

La competencia geoeconómica entre Estados Unidos y China en Brasil:

Implicaciones de política para Vietnam

La compétition géoéconomique entre les États-Unis et la Chine au Brésil :

implications politiques pour le Vietnam

A competição geoeconômica entre os Estados Unidos e a China no Brasil:

implicações políticas para o Vietnã

ABSTRACT The geoeconomic competition between the United States and China in Brazil reects the growing tenden-

cy of major powers to employ economic instruments to expand their inuence and shape global supply

chains. Drawing on a geoeconomic approach and employing qualitative research methods, including do-

cument analysis, case study, and comparative analysis, this study examines the strategies adopted by the

United States and China in the Brazilian market during the period 2014-2025, while also analyzing Brazil’s

responses to the competition between the two powers. The ndings indicate that the United States has

primarily relied on its comparative advantages in technology, nance, and innovation, whereas China has

256

US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

Van Nga

expanded its inuence through trade, infrastructure investment, energy cooperation, and supply chain in-

tegration. Brazil has pursued a hedging strategy by maintaining relations with both major powers in order

to maximize economic benets while preserving its strategic autonomy. Based on the Brazilian case, the

article proposes several policy implications for Vietnam, including the diversication of external economic

relations, the strengthening of domestic capabilities, and the enhancement of strategic autonomy in the

context of intensifying geoeconomic competition. The ndings highlight that strategic autonomy is best

achieved through the combination of diversied external partnerships and strengthened domestic capa-

bilities rather than alignment with any single major power. As a qualitative single-case study based pri-

marily on secondary sources, the ndings should be interpreted as analytical insights rather than broadly

generalizable conclusions.

Keywords: Geoeconomics; US-China competition; Brazil; strategic autonomy; Vietnam.

RESUMEN

La competencia geoeconómica entre Estados Unidos y China en Brasil reeja la creciente tendencia de

las grandes potencias a utilizar instrumentos económicos para ampliar su inuencia y congurar las cade-

nas de suministro globales. Basado en un enfoque geoeconómico y mediante métodos de investigación

cualitativa, que incluyen el análisis documental, el estudio de caso y el análisis comparativo, este estudio

examina las estrategias adoptadas por Estados Unidos y China en el mercado brasileño durante el período

2014–2025, así como la respuesta de Brasil ante la competencia entre ambas potencias. Los resultados

muestran que Estados Unidos ha basado principalmente su estrategia en sus ventajas comparativas en

tecnología, nanzas e innovación, mientras que China ha ampliado su inuencia mediante el comercio, la

inversión en infraestructura, la cooperación energética y la integración en las cadenas de suministro. Brasil

ha seguido una estrategia de hedging, manteniendo relaciones con ambas potencias con el n de maxi-

mizar los benecios económicos y preservar su autonomía estratégica. A partir del caso de Brasil, el artí-

culo propone varias implicaciones de política para Vietnam, entre ellas la diversicación de las relaciones

económicas exteriores, el fortalecimiento de las capacidades internas y el incremento de la autonomía es-

tratégica en un contexto de creciente competencia geoeconómica. Los resultados ponen de relieve que la

autonomía estratégica se alcanza de manera más efectiva mediante la combinación de una diversicación

de las relaciones exteriores y el fortalecimiento de las capacidades internas, en lugar del alineamiento con

una sola gran potencia. Al tratarse de un estudio cualitativo basado en un único caso y sustentado princi-

palmente en fuentes secundarias, los resultados deben interpretarse como aportes analíticos y no como

conclusiones ampliamente generalizables.

Palabras clave: geoeconomía; competencia entre Estados Unidos y China; Brasil; autonomía estratégica;

Vietnam.

RÉSUMÉ

La compétition géoéconomique entre les États-Unis et la Chine au Brésil illustre la tendance croissante

des grandes puissances à utiliser des instruments économiques pour étendre leur inuence et façonner les

chaînes d'approvisionnement mondiales. S'appuyant sur une approche géoéconomique et des méthodes

recherche

qualitatives,

notamment

l'analyse

documentaire,

l'étude

cas

l'analyse

comparative,

cette étude examine les stratégies adoptées par les États-Unis et la Chine sur le marché brésilien entre

2014 et 2025, tout en analysant les réponses du Brésil à cette compétition. Les résultats indiquent que les

États-Unis se sont principalement appuyés sur leurs avantages comparatifs en matière de technologie, de

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US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

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nance et d'innovation, tandis que la Chine a étendu son inuence par le biais du commerce, des inves-

tissements dans les infrastructures, de la coopération énergétique et de l'intégration des chaînes d'ap-

provisionnement. Le Brésil a adopté une stratégie de diversication en maintenant des relations avec les

deux grandes puissances an de maximiser ses avantages économiques tout en préservant son autonomie

stratégique. À partir de l'exemple brésilien, cet article propose plusieurs recommandations politiques pour

le Vietnam, notamment la diversication de ses relations économiques extérieures, le renforcement de ses

capacités nationales et le développement de son autonomie stratégique dans un contexte d'intensication

de la compétition géoéconomique. Les résultats soulignent que l'autonomie stratégique s'acquiert plus ef-

cacement par la combinaison de partenariats extérieurs diversiés et de capacités nationales renforcées

que par un alignement sur une seule grande puissance. S'agissant d'une étude de cas qualitative fondée

principalement sur des sources secondaires, les résultats doivent être interprétés comme des analyses

pertinentes et non comme des conclusions généralisables.

Mots-clés : Géoéconomie ; rivalité sino-américaine ; Brésil ; autonomie stratégique ; Vietnam.

RESUMO

A competição geoeconômica entre os Estados Unidos e a China no Brasil reete a crescente

tendência das grandes potências de empregar instrumentos econômicos para expandir sua in-

uência e moldar as cadeias de suprimentos globais. Com base em uma abordagem geoeco-

nômica e empregando métodos de pesquisa qualitativa, incluindo análise documental, estudo de

caso e análise comparativa, este estudo examina as estratégias adotadas pelos Estados Unidos

e pela China no mercado brasileiro durante o período de 2014 a 2025, analisando também as

respostas do Brasil à competição entre as duas potências. Os resultados indicam que os Estados

Unidos se basearam principalmente em suas vantagens comparativas em tecnologia, nanças e

inovação, enquanto a China expandiu sua inuência por meio do comércio, investimento em in-

fraestrutura, cooperação energética e integração da cadeia de suprimentos. O Brasil adotou uma

estratégia de proteção, mantendo relações com ambas as grandes potências a m de maximizar

os benefícios econômicos, preservando sua autonomia estratégica. Com base no caso brasile-

iro, o artigo propõe diversas implicações políticas para o Vietnã, incluindo a diversicação das

relações econômicas externas, o fortalecimento das capacidades internas e a ampliação da au-

tonomia estratégica no contexto da intensicação da competição geoeconômica. Os resultados

destacam que a autonomia estratégica é melhor alcançada por meio da combinação de parcerias

externas diversicadas e capacidades domésticas fortalecidas, em vez do alinhamento com uma

única grande potência. Como um estudo de caso único qualitativo baseado principalmente em

fontes secundárias, os resultados devem ser interpretados como insights analíticos, e não como

conclusões amplamente generalizáveis.

Palavras-chave: Geoeconomia; competição EUA-China; Brasil; autonomia estratégica; Vietnã.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, strategic competition between the

United

States

and

China

has

increasingly

expan-

ded beyond the security domain into the economic

sphere, making geoeconomics an important instru-

ment for pursuing national interests and expanding

international inuence. Through trade, investment,

nance, technology, energy, and supply chains, the

two

major

powers

seek

not

only

expand

their

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US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

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markets but also to shape economic and technolo-

gical networks in ways that advance their strategic

interests. This trend has become particularly evident

in emerging economies with strategic locations and

abundant natural resources, among which Brazil re-

presents a prominent case.

the

largest

economy

Latin

America

and

member of both BRICS and the G20, Brazil main-

tains

extensive

economic

relations

with

both

the

United States and China. While China has become

Brazil’s largest trading partner and has continuous-

ly expanded its investments in energy, mining, in-

frastructure, and manufacturing, the United States

remains a key partner in foreign direct investment,

technology,

nance,

the

digital

economy,

and

in-

novation. The simultaneous presence of these two

major powers has turned Brazil into one of the most

prominent arenas of geoeconomic competition, re-

ecting how major powers have adjusted their stra-

tegies in response to changes in the international

economic and political environment.

This article selects Brazil as a case study not be-

cause it is directly comparable to Vietnam in terms

of development conditions or geopolitical context,

but because it provides a representative example of

how a large emerging economy responds to stra-

tegic competition between major powers. Through

its diversied foreign policy and relatively indepen-

dent

development

strategy,

Brazil

has

maintained

cooperative

relations

with

both

the

United

States

and China in order to mobilize external resources

for development while minimizing the risks associa-

ted with excessive dependence on a single partner.

Although Brazil and Vietnam dier substantially in

economic scale, geostrategic position, and securi-

environment,

Brazil’s

experience

diversifying

external economic relations, strengthening domes-

tic capabilities, and preserving strategic autonomy

oers valuable lessons for Vietnam in the context of

intensifying great-power competition.

The policy implications for Vietnam are drawn from

Brazil’s

experience

because

both

countries

important

characteristics,

including

high

degree

of economic openness, deep integration into glo-

bal

value

chains,

and

growing

exposure

great-

power competition. Vietnam’s close economic ties

with both the United States and China also expose

it to risks arising from trade tensions, technologi-

cal

fragmentation,

and

changes

global

supply

chains. These similarities make Brazil’s experience

particularly relevant for informing Vietnam’s eorts

to diversify external economic relations and stren-

gthen its strategic autonomy. This approach is also

reected in Vietnam’s active participation in multi-

ple

free

trade

agreements

and

its

engagement

ASEAN, demonstrating its eorts to diversify eco-

nomic partnerships and maintain strategic exibility

amid major-power competition.

This study focuses on the period from 2014 to 2025.

The year 2014 is chosen as the starting point be-

cause it marked a new phase in Brazil-China eco-

nomic relations, characterized by the expansion of

trade, investment, and nancial cooperation within

the

BRICS

framework,

which

laid

the

foundation

for the subsequent intensication of geoeconomic

competition between the United States and China

in Brazil. The year 2014 also marked a turning point

in Brazil’s domestic economy, as growth began to

weaken after a period supported by favorable ex-

ternal conditions and high commodity prices. The

subsequent

recession

2015-2016

increased

the

importance of foreign markets, investment, and -

nancing, while reinforcing Brazil’s need to maintain

diversied economic relations with both China and

the United States.

Against

this

backdrop,

the

article

addresses

two

main

research

questions:

(1)

What

geoeconomic

instruments have the United States and China em-

ployed

expand

maintain

their

inuence

Brazil during the period 2014-2025? and (2) What

policy implications can Vietnam draw from Brazil’s

experience

strengthen

its

strategic

autonomy

and better adapt to intensifying geoeconomic com-

petition

between

major

powers?

Accordingly,

the

article aims to analyze the geoeconomic strategies

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US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

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of the United States and China in Brazil, assess Bra-

zil’s responses to the competition between the two

powers, and propose several policy implications for

Vietnam.

Given its focus on the Brazilian case, this study does

not seek to compare Brazil with other Latin Ameri-

can countries, nor does it provide a comprehensive

analysis of Brazil’s domestic political and social dy-

namics. Instead, the analysis concentrates on geoe-

conomic

competition

and

foreign

policy,

with

the

objective of drawing lessons that may be relevant

for Vietnam.

Literature Review

Competition between the United States and China

in Latin America, particularly in Brazil, has attrac-

ted

increasing

scholarly

attention

over

the

past

two decades. China's growing economic inuence,

together

with

the

strategic

adjustments

made

the United States, has generated diverse analytical

perspectives seeking to explain the nature, drivers,

and implications of great-power competition in the

region. Broadly speaking, the existing literature can

be classied into four major strands: (i) US–China

geoeconomic competition in Latin America; (ii) Chi-

na's expanding economic inuence in Brazil; (iii) US

strategic

adjustments

and

Brazil's

responses;

and

(iv) dependency theory perspectives on the chan-

ging international economic order.

The rst strand examines the intensifying compe-

tition between the United States and China across

Latin

America.

Gallagher

and

Porzecanski

(2008)

argue

that

the

rapid

expansion

Chinese

trade,

investment, and lending has fundamentally resha-

ped the external economic structures of many Latin

American

countries

while

simultaneously

challen-

ging

the

United

States'

traditional

position

the

region.

Jenkins

(2019)

further

contends

that

Chi-

na's rise has not only altered global trade ows but

also accelerated the restructuring of regional value

chains

and

investment

patterns

Latin

America.

According

Ellis

(2009),

US–China

competition

extends

well

beyond

trade,

encompassing

infras-

tructure

investment,

energy,

nance,

technology,

and

other

strategic

industries.

From

develop-

ment perspective, Wise (2020) argues that China's

growing presence has created new opportunities for

investment and market access while simultaneously

confronting Latin American countries with the cha-

llenge

strengthening

industrial

capabilities

and

avoiding

development

model

overly

dependent

on commodity exports.

Within this broader context, Brazil has emerged as

one of the principal arenas of geoeconomic com-

petition

between

the

two

powers.

Abreu

(2005)

was among the rst scholars to demonstrate that

China's rise signicantly transformed Brazil's trade

structure through rapidly growing demand for agri-

cultural commodities and raw materials. Gallagher

and

Porzecanski

(2008)

argue

that

China

Brazil

economic relations reect Beijing's long-term stra-

tegy of securing access to strategic resources while

expanding overseas markets for Chinese goods and

enterprises. Jenkins (2019) likewise identies Brazil

as a central component of China's strategy in Latin

America due to its large domestic market, abundant

natural resources, and increasingly inuential posi-

tion within BRICS.

recent

studies

indicate

that

geoeconomic

competition has expanded beyond trade to encom-

pass foreign direct investment and strategic sectors

of the economy. Dalla Costa, Bandeira, and Ferrari

(2019)

show

that

Chinese

investment

Brazil

in-

creased substantially after 2010, gradually shifting

from natural resource extraction toward electricity

generation,

oil

and

gas,

logistics,

and

manufactu-

ring. Torres (2020) argues that Chinese enterprises

have increasingly concentrated their investments in

strategic infrastructure sectors in order to establi-

long-term

economic

inuence.

Barbosa

(2021)

identies the electricity sector as one of the primary

destinations for Chinese investment in Brazil, whi-

Garcia

al.

(2023)

emphasize

the

importance

investment

facilitation

mechanisms

and

policy

coordination in expanding the presence of Chinese

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US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

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rms. From a trade perspective, Zhao et al. (2023)

nd

that

although

China

and

Brazil

exhibit

highly

complementary

trade

structures,

this

relationship

has also reinforced Brazil's dependence on exports

low-value-added

agricultural

and

mineral

com-

modities.

A second strand of research focuses on US strate-

gic

adjustments

and

Brazil's

responses

China's

expanding

inuence.

Malamud

(2017)

argues

that

relations among Brazil, the United States, and China

have evolved into a triangular framework in which

Brazil is not merely an object of great-power com-

petition but also an active actor capable of levera-

ging

rivalry

between

the

two

powers

advance

its national interests. Recent US policy documents

including

the

National

Security

Strategy

(2022,

2025), as well as reports issued by the Oce of the

United States Trade Representative (USTR), the US

Department of Commerce, and the US Department

of State - demonstrate that Washington increasin-

gly regards Brazil as an important partner in supply

chains, critical minerals, digital transformation, and

clean energy as part of broader eorts to reduce

dependence on China. Meanwhile, recent analyses

Alves

(2025)

and

Franco

(2025)

indicate

that

Brazil

has

continued

expanding

cooperation

with

China

trade

and

investment

while

maintaining

close relations with the United States in technology,

nance, and innovation. More recently, Cook et al.

(2025) argue that Brazil has adopted a exible stra-

tegy aimed at balancing its interests between the

two major powers rather than aligning exclusively

with either side.

Beyond

the

international

political

economy

lite-

rature,

numerous

Latin

American

scholars

have

approached this issue through the lens of depen-

dency

theory.

Cardoso

and

Faletto

(1979)

argue

that the development of Latin American economies

has historically been embedded within asymmetric

relationships in the international economic system,

causing industrialization to remain heavily inuen-

ced by external centers of power. Dos Santos (1970)

conceptualizes dependency as an outcome of the

dynamics of global capitalism, while Marini (1991)

emphasizes "super-exploitation of labor" as a de-

ning characteristic of dependent capitalism in La-

tin America. Bambirra (1978) further develops this

perspective

arguing

that

changes

economic

partners do not necessarily eliminate dependency

but may simply represent a shift from one center of

power to another. Although these theoretical pers-

pectives emerged during the Cold War, they conti-

nue to provide valuable analytical insights into whe-

ther China's expanding inuence represents a new

form

dependency

for

Brazil

instead

creates

greater

development

opportunities

for

emerging

economies.

Overall, the existing literature has signicantly ad-

vanced our understanding of US–China competition

in Latin America and Brazil's role within this process.

Nevertheless, most studies concentrate on bilateral

relationships or individual sectors such as trade, in-

vestment, or energy. Comprehensive analyses that

simultaneously

examine

the

geoeconomic

strate-

gies of both the United States and China in Brazil,

assess how Brazil has leveraged great-power com-

petition to advance its development objectives, and

derive policy implications for emerging economies

such as Vietnam remain relatively limited. This re-

search gap provides the foundation for the present

study, which approaches Brazil as a case study to

analyze US - China geoeconomic competition and

propose policy implications for Vietnam.

Research

Methodology

and

Theoretical

Fra-

mework

This study adopts a qualitative research approach,

combining

document

analysis

and

synthesis,

case

study,

and

comparative

analysis

examine

the

characteristics,

objectives,

and

implications

geoeconomic

competition

between

the

United

States and China in Brazil. Document analysis and

synthesis are employed to systematize the theore-

tical foundations and review the existing literature

on the strategies of the United States, China, and

Brazil. The sources include academic publications,

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US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

Van Nga

scholarly books, reports issued by international or-

ganizations, and ocial policy documents, such as

the US National Security Strategy (2022, 2025), re-

ports published by the Oce of the United States

Trade

Representative

(USTR),

the

Department

of Commerce, the US Department of State, the Cen-

tral Bank of Brazil, the BRICS Policy Center, AidDa-

ta, and other reliable statistical databases.

Brazil is selected as the case study to examine the

interaction between the geoeconomic strategies of

the United States and China and the responses of

the recipient country. As the largest economy in La-

tin America, China's leading trading partner in the

region, and a country that maintains close econo-

mic and investment relations with the United States,

Brazil

provides

appropriate

case

for

analyzing

contemporary

geoeconomic

competition

between

major

powers.

Comparative

analysis

employed

to examine the objectives, instruments, and imple-

mentation of the geoeconomic strategies pursued

by the United States and China in Brazil. It is also

used to assess changes in US policy under the Bi-

den and Trump administrations, thereby providing

a basis for drawing policy implications for Vietnam.

Regarding

the

theoretical

framework,

the

study

draws upon the geoeconomic approach developed

Blackwill

and

Harris

(2016),

which

argues

that

states employ economic instruments- including tra-

de, investment, nance, technology, energy, and su-

pply chains-to pursue strategic objectives and ex-

pand their international inuence. This framework

provides

the

analytical

foundation

for

examining

the geoeconomic instruments employed by the Uni-

ted States and China in Brazil.

The

study

also

applies

hedging

theory

explain

Brazil's responses to competition between the two

major

powers.

According

Goh

(2005),

middle

powers

typically

combine

multiple

policy

instru-

ments to minimize risks while preserving their stra-

tegic autonomy. Kuik (2008) argues that hedging

enables states to avoid making a denitive choice

between

competing

major

powers,

whereas

Lim

and

Cooper

(2015)

emphasize

the

importance

maintaining strategic exibility and avoiding exces-

sive dependence on any single partner. From this

perspective, Brazil is viewed as pursuing a hedging

strategy by expanding economic cooperation with

China while simultaneously maintaining close rela-

tions with the United States in technology, innova-

tion, and the energy transition.

In addition, the study draws on the concept of stra-

tegic

autonomy

derive

policy

implications

for

Vietnam. According to Beaucillon (2023), strategic

autonomy

refers

state's

ability

strengthen

its capacity for independent action while maintai-

ning international cooperation. Vu, Ngo, and Ngu-

yen (2024) conceptualize strategic autonomy as a

multidimensional

concept

closely

associated

with

strengthening

domestic

capabilities

and

diversif-

ying external relations. Building on these perspecti-

ves, this study uses Brazil's experience as a referen-

ce for proposing policy implications for Vietnam in

its eorts to build an independent and self-reliant

economy while pursuing comprehensive and deep

international integration.

DEVELOPMENT

4. The United States' and China's Strategies for Ac-

cessing the Brazilian Market

4.1. The United States' Strategy toward the Brazi-

lian Market

Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America, en-

dowed

with

abundant

natural

resources,

large

consumer market, and a strategic position in global

supply chains for minerals, energy, and agricultural

commodities.

Given

these

advantages,

Brazil

has

become one of the United States' most important

economic

partners

the

Western

Hemisphere.

Against the backdrop of China's rapidly expanding

economic

inuence

Latin

America,

the

United

States has sought to maintain its position in Brazil

through trade, investment, technology, and nance.

Unlike a strategy centered on resource extraction,

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the United States prioritizes high-value-added sec-

tors

such

digital

technology,

nancial

services,

advanced manufacturing, and high-tech agriculture.

To achieve these objectives, the United States has

promoted the presence of its enterprises in sectors

where it enjoys comparative advantages. In infor-

mation technology, US rms provide digital infras-

tructure, software, and digital transformation solu-

tions for the Brazilian market (U.S. Department of

Commerce, 2024). In the nancial sector, the Uni-

ted States has strengthened cooperation between

nancial

institutions

and

the

Brazilian

market

facilitate business investment and commercial ex-

pansion (U.S. Department of State, 2024). In agri-

culture, bilateral cooperation has focused on tech-

nology transfer, mechanization, and the application

of digital technologies to enhance agricultural pro-

ductivity and competitiveness.

Over the past decade, the United States has gra-

dually

strengthened

the

institutional

framework

governing bilateral economic relations. The Agree-

ment on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ATEC),

which entered into force in 2011, focuses on redu-

cing non-tari barriers and improving the business

environment. This was followed by the Protocol Re-

lating

Trade

Rules

and

Transparency,

signed

2020 and entering into force in 2022, which intro-

duced provisions on trade facilitation, transparency,

and

anti-corruption

measures,

thereby

creating

more favorable business environment for US com-

panies operating in Brazil.

Consequently, bilateral trade maintained an upward

trajectory during the 2014-2025 period. Brazil's ex-

ports to the United States increased from US$27.1

billion in 2014 to US$38.1 billion in 2025 (UN Com-

trade, 2026). Brazil’s trade with the United States

covers

relatively

wide

range

products,

from

primary

commodities

manufactured

goods.

2024,

ve

major

export

items

oil,

semi-nished

iron and steel products, pig iron, coee, and airpla-

nes - made up nearly 40% of Brazil’s total exports

to the U.S. Brazil’s imports from the U.S. were more

diversied, with machinery and equipment, fuel oils,

airplanes, and natural gas together accounting for

about 34% of total imports (Banco Central do Brasil,

2025). The composition of bilateral trade points to a

clear degree of complementarity between the two

economies. Brazil mainly supplies commodities and

industrial inputs, whereas the United States exports

broader

range

machinery,

energy

products,

and technology-intensive goods. This pattern also

reects dierences in the two countries’ production

structures, as Brazil remains relatively more depen-

dent on resource-based exports, while the United

States has a stronger presence in higher-value-ad-

ded manufacturing and technology-intensive indus-

tries.

FDI remains another key instrument through which

the

United

States

consolidates

its

economic

pre-

sence in Brazil. According to 2023 data, the United

States

was

the

largest

foreign

investor

Brazil,

with an FDI stock of approximately US$87.9 billion,

concentrated in software and information technolo-

gy services, nancial services, food and beverages,

chemicals,

and

telecommunications.

Meanwhile,

Brazilian FDI in the United States totaled approxi-

mately US$31.8 billion, primarily in the energy, food,

and

chemical

industries

(SelectUSA,

2024).

The

substantial investment gap reects the United Sta-

tes' dominant position in bilateral investment rela-

tions as well as the attractiveness of the Brazilian

market for US enterprises. Notably, US investment

has been directed mainly toward technology-inten-

sive and high-value-added industries through joint

ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and the expan-

sion of production facilities. These investments have

strengthened the presence of US rms in techno-

logy, nance, and service sectors while integrating

Brazil more closely into global value chains led by

the United States.

Overall,

the

United

States'

strategy

toward

Brazil

has

been

implemented

through

combination

institutional

frameworks,

trade,

and

investment.

Trade enables the United States to sustain export

markets for high-technology products while secu-

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ring supplies of strategic raw materials, whereas fo-

reign direct investment reinforces the position of US

rms in high-value-added industries. This approach

reects the United States' comparative advantages

in technology, nance, and innovation while helping

preserve its economic inuence in Latin America's

largest

economy

amid

intensifying

competition

with China.

4.2. China's Strategy toward the Brazilian Market

Following its accession to the World Trade Organi-

zation (WTO) in 2001, China gradually implemen-

ted a strategy aimed at becoming a global trading

power by expanding export markets, securing ac-

cess to strategic raw materials, and promoting ou-

tward foreign investment. Within this strategy, Bra-

zil occupies a particularly important position due to

its status as the largest economy in Latin America,

its abundant natural resources, and its increasingly

signicant role in global supply chains. Consequent-

ly, China has regarded Brazil as a priority partner for

securing supplies of strategic resources while simul-

taneously

expanding

markets

for

Chinese

goods,

investment, and cooperation in infrastructure, tech-

nology, and nance (Li, 2012).

China-Brazil

relations

have

been

progressively

strengthened

through

series

institutional

up-

grades, from the establishment of diplomatic rela-

tions in 1974, to the strategic partnership in 1993,

and nally the comprehensive strategic partnership

in 2012. Against this institutional backdrop, bilate-

ral trade has expanded rapidly. Since 2009, China

has surpassed the United States to become Brazil's

largest trading partner and, since 2012, its largest

source of imports (Franco, 2025). During the period

2014-2025, Brazil's exports to China increased from

US$40.6 billion to US$100 billion, while its imports

from China rose from US$39.4 billion to US$75.9 bi-

llion (United Nations Statistics Division, 2026).

Brazil’s

trade

with

China

heavily

concentrated

in a few commodity products. In 2024, soybeans,

oil, iron ore, beef, and cellulose together accounted

for about 90% of Brazil’s exports to China, which

totaled

USD

billion.

Imports

from

China

were

considerably

diverse.

Electric

vehicles,

tele-

communications

equipment,

chemicals,

and

solar

panels

accounted

for

around

22%

Brazil’s

total

imports from the country (Banco Central do Brasil,

2025). The two sides therefore have quite dierent

export

proles.

Brazil

mainly

supplies

agricultural

products, minerals, and other commodities to the

Chinese market, while China exports a wider range

of manufactured and technology-related goods to

Brazil. This dierence is also reected in the broader

structure of bilateral trade, with Brazil relying more

on commodity exports and China playing a larger

role in the supply of industrial and technology-in-

tensive products.

In addition to trade, FDI has become a key instru-

ment through which China has expanded its econo-

mic presence in Brazil. Following the implementa-

tion of the "Going Out" strategy and, in particular,

the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in

2013, Chinese investment has extended beyond se-

curing

access

natural

resources

encompass

infrastructure,

logistics,

energy,

and

technology,

thereby

broadening

China's

long-term

economic

inuence (Garcia et al., 2023). Chinese investment

accelerated

signicantly

after

the

2008

global

-

nancial crisis, and from the early 2010s onward Bra-

zil emerged as one of China's most important FDI

destinations in Latin America (Dalla Costa, Bandei-

ra, & Ferrari, 2019).

During

the

initial

phase,

Chinese

investment

was

concentrated in mining, oil and gas, and agricultu-

re in order to secure supplies of iron ore, crude oil,

and

soybeans.

the

same

time,

this

investment

pattern reinforced Brazil's specialization in primary

commodity exports (Abreu, 2005). In recent years,

however, Chinese investment has shifted markedly

toward

infrastructure,

logistics,

renewable

energy,

technology,

and

manufacturing,

reecting

China's

objective

expanding

its

presence

higher-va-

lue-added industries while strengthening its control

over strategic supply chains (Torres, 2020). Major

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Chinese

corporations-including

State

Grid,

China

Three

Gorges

Corporation

(CTG),

China

General

Nuclear Power (CGN), SPIC, Huawei, ZTE, BYD, and

DiDi

Chuxing

have

invested

extensively

clean

energy, electricity transmission, logistics, and digi-

tal technologies. In particular, BYD's electric vehicle

manufacturing plant in Camaçari illustrates China's

growing emphasis on advanced manufacturing and

high-technology

industries

(Barbosa,

2021;

BYD,

2023; Lou Yu, 2024). This investment expansion has

been

supported

state-owned

nancial

institu-

tions such as the China Development Bank (CDB)

and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim-

bank), which have provided nancing for large-sca-

le projects and facilitated China's long-term econo-

mic presence in Brazil (Garcia et al., 2023).

Overall,

China's

strategy

toward

Brazil

has

been

implemented through a combination of trade and

investment.

While

trade

serves

secure

strate-

gic raw materials and expand markets for Chinese

manufactured goods, investment enables China to

strengthen its presence in infrastructure, energy, te-

chnology, and other strategic sectors. Through this

integrated approach, China has not only expanded

its economic interests but also increased its inuen-

ce in Latin America's largest economy, thereby in-

tensifying geoeconomic competition with the Uni-

ted States in Brazil.

5. Geoeconomic Competition between the United

States and China in Brazil and Its Impacts on Brazil

5.1. Geoeconomic Competition between the United

States and China in Brazil

The

case

Brazil

demonstrates

that

competition

between the United States and China extends be-

yond trade volumes or investment ows to encom-

pass the ability to establish and shape strategica-

lly

signicant

economic

networks.

According

the geoeconomic approach proposed by Blackwill

and Harris (2016), states employ economic instru-

ments-including trade, investment, nance, techno-

logy, and supply chains-to pursue geopolitical ob-

jectives. In Brazil, both the United States and China

have

relied

these

instruments

maintain

and

expand their inuence, although dierences in their

resource

endowments,

development

models,

and

implementation strategies have resulted in two dis-

tinct geoeconomic approaches.

Competition between the United States and China

in Brazil reects the contrast between two dierent

models of exercising economic inuence. The United

States primarily relies on its comparative advanta-

ges in technology, nance, innovation, and the glo-

bal reach of its multinational corporations. Throu-

foreign

direct

investment,

technology

transfer,

nancial services, and cooperation in sectors such

as the digital economy, clean energy, and high-tech

manufacturing, the United States maintains its in-

uence by participating in the highest value-added

segments

global

value

chains.

other

words,

the principal geoeconomic instrument of the United

States lies in its capacity to provide technological

capabilities, knowledge, and institutional resources,

thereby

shaping

development

standards

and

Bra-

zil's integration into the global economy.

In contrast, China has pursued a geoeconomic strate-

gy based on the combination of trade, infrastructure

investment, and the nancial capacity of state-ow-

ned

enterprises.

Becoming

Brazil's

largest

trading

partner has enabled China to establish a central posi-

tion within Brazil's export network, particularly with

respect to iron ore, soybeans, and crude oil. At the

same time, through investments in energy, logistics,

telecommunications, electric vehicles, and green te-

chnologies, China has gradually expanded its presen-

ce from trade into sectors that are strategically im-

portant for Brazil's long-term development. Whereas

the United States exerts inuence primarily through

technology and institutions, China enhances its in-

uence through large-scale nancing, infrastructure

development, and the integration of Brazil into pro-

duction networks led by China.

These contrasting approaches indicate that geoe-

conomic competition in Brazil is not simply about

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determining

which

country

the

larger

trading

partner,

but

rather

about

competing

for

strategic

positions

within

global

value

chains.

China

enjoys

advantages in securing export markets for Brazil's

primary

commodities

while

supplying

competiti-

vely priced manufactured goods. The United States,

by contrast, retains comparative advantages in high

technology, nance, and innovation. This has crea-

ted a relationship characterized by both competi-

tion and complementarity, whereby Brazil depends

on the Chinese market to sustain its exports while

simultaneously relying on U.S. technology and in-

vestment to enhance its productive capacity.

Nevertheless, competition between the two powers

has not reduced Brazil to a passive arena of geopoli-

tical rivalry. Instead, Brazil's response clearly reects

the hedging strategy identied by Goh (2005), Kuik

(2008), and Lim and Cooper (2015) as a common

approach adopted by middle powers operating in

environments characterized by great-power compe-

tition. Rather than pursuing hard balancing against

one side or aligning exclusively with a single major

power, Brazil has maintained cooperative relations

with both the United States and China in order to

maximize economic benets while minimizing stra-

tegic risks. Continuing to expand trade with China

while preserving cooperation with the United States

in technology, investment, and innovation illustrates

Brazil's exible approach to safeguarding its policy

autonomy.

Brazil's hedging strategy also highlights the critical

importance

domestic

capabilities

leveraging

great-power competition. Its abundant natural re-

sources,

large

domestic

market,

and

active

parti-

cipation in international institutions such as BRICS

and the G20 have strengthened Brazil's bargaining

position and enabled it to preserve a relatively high

degree of strategic exibility. Nevertheless, Brazil's

ability

benet

from

U.S.–China

competition

re-

mains constrained by structural weaknesses within

its

economy.

Heavy

dependence

commodity

exports

China

risks

reinforcing

development

model based on natural resource advantages rather

than promoting industrial upgrading. At the same

time, technological competition between the Uni-

ted

States

and

China

presents

Brazil

with

increa-

singly

complex

choices

concerning

technological

standards, data security, and digital transformation.

From the perspective of strategic autonomy, Brazil's

experience demonstrates that maintaining indepen-

dence in an environment of great-power competi-

tion

does

not

require

reducing

engagement

with

major partners. Rather, it depends on diversifying

external relations, strengthening domestic capabili-

ties, and selectively choosing areas of cooperation

that best serve national interests. As emphasized by

Beaucillon (2023) and Vu, Ngo, and Nguyen (2024),

strategic

autonomy

should

not

understood

isolation from global economic networks, but as the

capacity to participate in them from a more autono-

mous and proactive position.

Overall, geoeconomic competition between the Uni-

ted States and China in Brazil reects the broader

transformation from traditional power competition

toward

competition

through

strategic

economic

resources. Both countries seek not only to expand

market

access

but

also

shape

future

trade,

in-

vestment, technological, and supply-chain networ-

ks. For Brazil, this competition has generated both

opportunities to access external resources for de-

velopment and new forms of economic dependen-

ce.

Brazil's

experience

suggests

that

the

benets

of great-power competition can only be translated

into

sustainable

development

when

the

recipient

country maintains a balanced foreign policy, streng-

thens its domestic capabilities, and pursues a long-

term development strategy aligned with its national

interests.

5.2. Impacts on Brazil

Geoeconomic competition between the United Sta-

tes and China has generated profound impacts on

Brazil. While creating new opportunities for trade

and investment, it has also reshaped the country's

domestic

distribution

economic

interests

and

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posed new challenges for its national development

strategy.

the

largest

economy

Latin

Ameri-

ca and a country maintaining close economic ties

with both the United States and China, Brazil has

been able to benet from the rivalry between the

two powers while simultaneously facing increasing

pressure

sustain

economic

growth

and

preser-

its

strategic

autonomy.

According

Cook

al.

(2024),

U.S.–China

competition

has

enhanced

Brazil's strategic importance in the foreign policies

of both Washington and Beijing, while making the

country's

development

environment

increasingly

complex.

From an economic perspective, trade tensions be-

tween the United States and China-particularly sin-

ce 2018-together with China's imposition of taris

on a wide range of U.S. products and its eorts to

diversify sources of food and raw materials to stren-

gthen resource security, have signicantly increased

Chinese demand for Brazilian products such as soy-

beans, iron ore, crude oil, and beef. Consequently,

exports and investment in agriculture, mining, and

logistics have expanded considerably. Casagrande,

Mallmann, and Feistel (2026) argue that U.S.–China

competition has generated a trade diversion eect

that

enabled

Brazil

expand

its

export

market

share in several sectors where it enjoys compara-

tive

advantages.

However,

these

gains

have

been

largely

short-term

and

concentrated

primary

commodities, while exports of manufactured goods

and high-technology products have shown limited

improvement.

the

same

time,

Brazil's

growing

dependence on the Chinese market has increased

its vulnerability to uctuations in Chinese demand

and changes in trade relations between the major

powers. Meanwhile, the United States has remained

Brazil's

principal

partner

foreign

direct

invest-

ment,

advanced

technology,

nance,

and

innova-

tion.

The benets and costs of this competition have not

been

distributed

evenly

across

domestic

interest

groups. The agribusiness, mining, and logistics sec-

tors have been the principal beneciaries of rising

Chinese demand for agricultural products and raw

materials.

Although

agriculture

accounts

for

only

approximately 6.8 percent of Brazil's GDP, it con-

tributes nearly 42 percent of the country's total ex-

ports, underscoring its increasingly important role

in the national economy (OECD, 2024). By contrast,

many manufacturing industries have faced greater

competitive pressures due to relatively low produc-

tivity, limited value-added production, and the on-

going restructuring of global supply chains. At the

same time, rms operating in technology, nance,

and

aerospace

have

continued

maintain

partnerships with the United States in order to gain

access to capital, advanced technologies, and inter-

national markets. These divergent interests among

domestic economic sectors have created signicant

policy challenges for the Brazilian government as it

seeks to balance the promotion of commodity ex-

ports with the development of higher-value-added

industries.

Against this backdrop, geoeconomic competition

between the United States and China has also en-

couraged Brazil to adjust its development model

strengthening

national

competitiveness

and

reducing excessive dependence on primary com-

modity exports. While continuing to capitalize on

its

comparative

advantages

natural

resources

and agriculture, Brazil has increasingly recognized

the need to promote innovation, expand advanced

manufacturing, foster high-technology industries,

and develop a highly skilled workforce in order to

integrate

deeply

into

global

value

chains.

These

eorts

are

essential

for

enhancing

Brazil's

resilience

and

its

capacity

adapt

the

evol-

ving dynamics of geoeconomic competition in the

years ahead.

5.3. Brazil's Experience in Responding to U.S. - Chi-

na Geoeconomic Competition

Brazil's experience in responding to geoeconomic

competition between the United States and China

demonstrates

that

eectively

leveraging

opportu-

nities arising from the external environment must

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be accompanied by the strengthening of domestic

capabilities in order to ensure sustainable growth

and preserve policy autonomy.

From the perspective of dependency theory, Bra-

zil's experience highlights the structural risks asso-

ciated with maintaining a high level of dependence

on exports of primary commodities and agricultural

products. Rising Chinese demand for imports, to-

gether

with

the

trade

diversion

eects

generated

U.S.–China

competition,

has

stimulated

export

growth and generated substantial revenues for Bra-

zil's commercial agricultural sector. However, these

benets

have

simultaneously

reinforced

resour-

ce-based growth model, slowed the diversication

the

country's

economic

structure,

constrained

the development of higher-value-added industries,

and

increased

Brazil's

vulnerability

uctuations

in international markets (Casagrande, Mallmann, &

Feistel, 2026; OECD, 2024). This suggests that the

opportunities created by great-power competition

can

only

generate

sustainable

long-term

benets

when they are accompanied by strategies aimed at

strengthening

productive

capacity,

promoting

te-

chnological

innovation,

and

developing

industries

with higher value-added.

From the perspective of hedging theory, Brazil de-

monstrates that emerging economies can preserve

policy space and maximize national interests by di-

versifying their relationships with major powers ra-

ther than aligning exclusively with a single partner.

Brazil has continued to maintain China as its princi-

pal export market and a major source of investment

infrastructure

and

energy,

while

simultaneously

preserving close cooperation with the United Sta-

tes in high technology, nance, innovation, and eco-

nomic

governance

(Goh,

2005;

Kuik,

2008).

This

approach not only reduces the risks associated with

excessive dependence on a single partner but also

enables Brazil to capitalize on the complementary

advantages oered by both major powers, thereby

preserving

strategic

exibility

and

enhancing

its

resilience in an increasingly uncertain international

economic environment.

More importantly, the Brazilian case demonstrates

that

strategic

autonomy

not

achieved

through

disengagement

from

global

economic

networks.

Rather, it is built upon the combination of proac-

tive

international

integration

and

the

continuous

strengthening

domestic

development

capabili-

ties. Strategic autonomy is reected in a country's

ability

preserve

independent

decision-making,

diversify

its

external

partnerships,

and

enhance

the

competitiveness

its

economy

amid

intensi-

fying

great-power

competition

(Beaucillon,

2023;

Vu, Ngo, & Nguyen, 2024). By leveraging its role in

multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the G20,

while simultaneously promoting domestic reforms

to strengthen industrial capacity, foster innovation,

and improve infrastructure, Brazil has gradually ex-

panded its strategic room for maneuver and mitiga-

ted the pressures arising from great-power rivalry.

This experience suggests that, for Vietnam, geoeco-

nomic competition among major powers can serve

as a catalyst for long-term development only when

embedded within a national development strategy

centered

strengthening

domestic

capabilities,

promoting innovation, diversifying external econo-

mic relations, and progressively moving up global

value chains. Only on this foundation can strategic

autonomy be realized as a substantive development

capacity rather than merely an objective of foreign

policy.

6. Policy Implications for Vietnam

Although Brazil and Vietnam dier signicantly in

terms

territorial

size,

geopolitical

position,

and

economic structure, both are developing economies

with a high degree of openness and are increasin-

gly

aected

geoeconomic

competition

among

major

powers.

Vietnam

remains

committed

independent

and

self-reliant

foreign

policy

while

pursuing the diversication and multilateralization

of its external relations. At the same time, it seeks

to build an independent and self-reliant economy

integrated with comprehensive, deep, and eective

international integration. In recent years, alongside

the deepening of international integration, the need

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to strengthen strategic autonomy has been increa-

singly emphasized in the Party's and the State's po-

licy documents. In this context, strategic autonomy

does

not

imply

reducing

international

integration

minimizing

interdependence

within

the

global

economy. Rather, it refers to strengthening domes-

tic

capabilities

respond

proactively

external

shocks while preserving the exibility to cooperate

with multiple partners on the basis of national inte-

rests. This orientation is clearly reected in Resolu-

tion No.59-NQ/TW (2025) of the Politburo, which

emphasizes the need to build an independent and

self-reliant economy alongside proactive, compre-

hensive, and eective international integration, whi-

strengthening

national

resilience

and

strategic

autonomy amid an increasingly complex internatio-

nal environment.

The characteristics of Vietnam's economy make this

objective particularly important. Vietnam is one of the

world's most open economies, with manufacturing and

exports serving as the principal engines of economic

growth. The United States is currently Vietnam's lar-

gest export market and an important partner in invest-

ment, technology, and innovation. China, meanwhile,

is Vietnam's largest trading partner and the principal

supplier of raw materials, machinery, equipment, and

intermediate

inputs

for

domestic

production.

These

close economic ties with both economies have ena-

bled Vietnam to expand its markets, attract foreign in-

vestment, and integrate more deeply into global value

chains. At the same time, however, they have increased

Vietnam's

vulnerability

the

evolving

dynamics

geoeconomic competition between the United States

and China. Therefore, Brazil should not be regarded as

a model that can be directly replicated in Vietnam. Ra-

ther, it serves as a valuable case study that illustrates

both the opportunities and the challenges confronting

a developing economy seeking to maintain close rela-

tions with the world's two largest economic powers.

Against this background, this study proposes several

policy implications for Vietnam.

First,

Vietnam

should

continue

uphold

its

poli-

independence,

self-reliance,

multilateraliza-

tion, and diversication of external relations while

exibly utilizing external economic instruments to

safeguard national interests. Brazil's experience de-

monstrates

that

maintaining

cooperative

relations

with both the United States and China can broaden

policy space, enable access to resources from mul-

tiple partners, and reduce the pressure to align ex-

clusively with either major power. However, such a

balancing

strategy

can

only

sustained

when

country is capable of clearly identifying its core na-

tional interests and managing its external relations

with strategic exibility. For Vietnam, strengthening

participation in multilateral cooperation mechanis-

ms, maximizing the benets of next-generation free

trade agreements such as the CPTPP, EVFTA, and

RCEP, while expanding partnerships with emerging

economies, would contribute to diversifying deve-

lopment opportunities and mitigating the risks ari-

sing from great-power competition.

Second, Vietnam should further diversify its export

markets, supply chains, and sources of foreign in-

vestment in order to strengthen the resilience of its

economy. The Brazilian case demonstrates that ex-

cessive dependence on commodity exports to Chi-

na may stimulate trade growth in the short term but

also increase vulnerability to uctuations in interna-

tional demand and commodity prices. For Vietnam,

the

key

lesson

extends

beyond

expanding

export

markets to include the diversication of sources of

raw

materials,

intermediate

goods,

and

technolo-

gies

essential

for

domestic

production.

Alongside

maintaining

stable

economic

relations

with

both

the United States and China, Vietnam should make

greater

eorts

expand

economic

cooperation

with markets in Latin America, the Middle East, Afri-

ca, and South Asia, while encouraging domestic en-

terprises to integrate more deeply into regional and

global supply chains in order to reduce dependence

on any single market or partner.

Third,

Vietnam

should

strengthen

its

domestic

capabilities as the foundation of strategic auto-

nomy.

Geoeconomic

competition

between

the

United

States

and

China

has

expanded

beyond

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US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

Van Nga

trade

into

such

areas

advanced

technology,

data governance, articial intelligence, semicon-

ductors,

clean

energy,

critical

minerals,

and

su-

pply chains. Under these circumstances, a coun-

try's

competitiveness

depends

not

only

its

ability to attract foreign investment but also on

its

scientic

and

technological

capabilities,

in-

novation

capacity,

and

the

quality

its

human

resources. Brazil's experience suggests that subs-

tantial inows of foreign capital do not automati-

cally generate sustainable competitiveness if the

economy continues to rely primarily on exports of

low-value-added products. Accordingly, Vietnam

should

continue

prioritize

the

development

high-technology

industries,

semiconductors,

articial

intelligence,

renewable

energy,

and

su-

pporting

industries.

the

same

time,

stronger

linkages

between

domestic

enterprises

and

fo-

reign-invested

rms

are

needed

increase

lo-

cal

content

and

gradually

move

Vietnamese

in-

dustries toward higher-value-added segments of

global value chains.

Fourth,

Vietnam

should

strengthen

its

economic

strategic autonomy by enhancing its capacity for fo-

recasting and managing risks arising from changes

in the international environment. Brazil's experience

illustrates

that

competition

among

major

powers

creates not only opportunities for trade expansion

and investment attraction but also pressures related

to technology, nance, trade standards, and supply

chain security. Vietnam should therefore establish

more eective mechanisms for monitoring geoeco-

nomic trends and assessing the potential impacts

of the trade, investment, and technology policies of

major powers on the domestic economy. In addition,

closer

coordination

among

government

agencies,

businesses, and research institutions is essential for

designing timely and eective policy responses. At

the same time, Vietnam should continue improving

its market institutions, upgrading the quality of hu-

man resources, fostering innovation, and strengthe-

ning the competitiveness of domestic enterprises in

order to enhance the economy's resilience against

external shocks.

Nevertheless,

the

lessons

drawn

from

Brazil

must

interpreted

light

the

signicant

dieren-

ces between the two countries. Brazil is the largest

economy in Latin America, endowed with abundant

natural resources, a member of BRICS, and occupies

a distinct regional position. Vietnam, by contrast, is

export-oriented

economy

that

depends

heavily on manufacturing and processing industries

and is located in the Indo-Pacic, where strategic

competition

among

major

powers

considerably

more intense. Consequently, the Brazilian experien-

ce should not be viewed as a model to be applied

directly. Rather, it provides useful insights into how

developing

economy

can

leverage

great-power

competition to expand its development opportuni-

ties while strengthening strategic autonomy and sa-

feguarding national interests. For Vietnam, the key

challenge is not to choose between major powers,

but to build sucient domestic capabilities to en-

gage proactively with all partners on the basis of

national interests and the objective of sustainable

development.

Vietnam’s active participation in multiple free trade

agreements and its engagement in ASEAN illustrate

this approach, allowing the country to expand eco-

nomic partnerships while maintaining room for in-

dependent policy choices. This experience is consis-

tent with the lesson from Brazil that diversication

and strategic exibility are essential for preserving

autonomy amid intensifying major-power competi-

tion.

CONCLUSIONS

The geoeconomic competition between the United

States and China in Brazil reects the transformation

power

competition

today’s

global

economy,

where economic instruments have increasingly be-

come key means for major powers to maintain and

expand their inuence. Drawing on the geoecono-

mic framework developed by Blackwill and Harris

(2016),

this

study

demonstrates

that

the

United

States and China have adopted distinct approaches

toward Brazil. While the United States primarily re-

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US-China Geoeconomic Competition in Brazil: Policy Implications for Vietnam

Van Nga

lies

its

comparative

advantages

technology,

nance,

innovation,

and

global

business

networks

to maintain its position in high value-added sectors,

China has expanded its inuence through large-sca-

le trade, infrastructure investment, energy coopera-

tion, and nancial capacity, thereby strengthening

its role in strategic supply chains. These dierences

indicate that geoeconomic competition extends be-

yond market access to encompass the shaping of

future production networks, technological ecosys-

tems, and development standards.

The study also nds that Brazil has not remained a

passive

actor

the

competition

between

the

two

major powers. Instead, it has pursued a hedging stra-

tegy, maintaining cooperative relations with both the

United States and China while maximizing economic

benets and preserving strategic autonomy in poli-

cymaking. However, Brazil’s experience demonstra-

tes that the benets derived from major-power com-

petition can only be sustained when accompanied by

stronger

domestic

capabilities,

diversied

external

economic relations, and reduced dependence on any

single partner or development model.

From

theoretical

perspective,

the

ndings

sug-

gest that geoeconomic competition among major

powers extends beyond trade, investment, and -

nancial relations to inuence the productive capabi-

lities, technological development, and policy space

developing

countries.The

Brazilian

case

shows

that hedging can help countries navigate compe-

tition among major powers, capitalize on emerging

opportunities,

limit

the

risks

excessive

depen-

dence,

and

preserve

room

for

independent

poli-

cy choices. This indicates that strategic autonomy

does

not

mean

reducing

international

integration,

but rather requires diversifying external economic

relations, strengthening domestic capabilities, and

maintaining the capacity to adapt. This approach is

also

consistent

with

Vietnam’s

orientation

toward

strategic

autonomy,

building

independent

and

self-reliant economy in conjunction with internatio-

nal integration, and promoting science, technology,

and innovation.

For Vietnam, the Brazilian case oers valuable policy

insights in the context of intensifying geoeconomic

competition

among

major

powers.

Although

Bra-

zil’s experience cannot be directly replicated due to

dierences in economic scale, geopolitical position,

and industrial structure, it highlights the importan-

maintaining

independent

and

self-reliant

foreign policy; diversifying markets, supply chains,

and investment sources; and strengthening domes-

tic

scientic

and

technological

capabilities,

inno-

vation, and economic competitiveness. In the long

term,

country’s

ability

adapt

major-power

competition

depends

not

aligning

with

any

particular power, but on its capacity to participate

proactively in global economic networks, safeguard

national interests, and preserve strategic autonomy

throughout its development process.

This study is subject to the limitations of a qualita-

tive single-case design based primarily on secon-

dary

sources.

Accordingly,

its

ndings

should

interpreted as analytical insights rather than broad-

ly generalizable conclusions. Future research could

adopt comparative and mixed-method approaches

to examine how dierent developing countries res-

pond

geoeconomic

competition

among

major

powers.

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